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The inclusion of socio-economic rights in South Africa’s transformative Con- 
stitution, it was felt, would make the Constitution relevant to the majority of 
South Africans, in particular the previously oppressed. Accordingly, the courts, 
the Constitutional Court in particular, have sought to translate these rights into 
concrete benefits that make a real difference for those for whom poverty is a 
lived reality, demonstrating that they are willing to enforce not just the negative 
prohibitions but also the positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights. 
Notwithstanding this, the extent to which the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court contribute to social change has been limited by a number of factors including 
inadequate implementation of court orders. This article illustrates that, though 
significant progress has been made, much still needs to be done to promote 
socio-economic transformation in the interests of the poor and disadvantaged.
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Introduction
The South African Constitution of 1996 (the Constitution) is characterised by its 
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respect to strengthening the legal status of socio-economic rights in South Africa 
was in the area of justiciability. Prior to recognising these rights as justiciable, 
objections were raised regarding their inclusion in a bill of rights. The objectors 
did not consider socio-economic rights as universally-accepted fundamental 
rights to be included in a bill of rights, and felt that their inclusion was inconsistent 
with a doctrine of separation of powers (Davis, 1992; 2004). The justiciability 
debate resulted in an argument before the Constitutional Court, in the process of 
certification of the 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa. The Court rejected 
the objections and was of the view that courts can, and at least sometimes 
will, provide a remedy for aggrieved individuals claiming a violation of socio-
economic rights (Ex-parte chairperson of the constitutional assembly: in re- 
certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (First 
certification judgement) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 77–78). The Court’s judge- 
ment opened the door to the inclusion of a range of socio-economic rights in the 
1996 Constitution and subsequent judicial enforcement of these rights. These 
include environmental rights (Section 24), land/property rights (Section 25), 
right to housing (Section 26), rights to health care, food, water, and social security 
and assistance (Section 27), socio-economic rights of children—to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services (Section 28), right 
to education (Section 29) and socio-economic rights of detained persons—to 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at 
state expense (Section 35[2][e]). 
It was felt that including socio-economic rights in the Constitution would 
make the Constitution relevant to the majority of South Africans, in particular 
the previously oppressed (Goldstone, 2006: 4). It was also in recognition of the 
fact that a lack of access to socio-economic resources and services constitutes 
a major impediment to people’s ability to participate as equals in a demo- 
cracy (Liebenberg, 2007: 3). South Africa went further than most countries by 
incorporating the socio-economic rights in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) along with other rights, such as 
access to water and to a clean and healthy environment, not explicitly stated in 
the ICESCR.
However, over a decade into democracy, though some progress has been made 
in enforcing these rights (Ndletyana et al., 2008) socio-economic concerns still 
plague the South African society. The extent of poverty in the country is evidenced 
by, among other things, shacks, homelessness, unemployment and lack of access 
to basic services. HIV/AIDS, food and housing insecurity are still major problems. 
A majority of the population continue to be deprived of access to basic services 
and their participation in decision-making processes of government and service 
delivery projects is limited. 
This article therefore looks at the South African Constitutional Court’s role in 
social change. ‘Social change’ and ‘social transformation’ are used in this article 
interchangeably. The article considers how the Court has endeavoured to 
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translate socio-economic rights into concrete benefits that make a real difference 
for those for whom poverty is a lived reality and the impact of its decisions on 
society. The focus on the Constitutional Court does not, however, overlook or 
rule out the ability of other courts to bring about social change (see, for example, 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2008 (4) SA 471 (W), a case in which a lower 
court (the High Court) adopted a progressive approach to the realisation of the 
rights of the poor).
The Constitution as an Instrument of Social Change
The Constitution has been described by many as a transformative Constitution. It 
is committed to transforming the South African society from one based on 
economic deprivation to one based on equal distribution of resources (Klare, 1998). 
The aim of the Constitution is to advance the socio-economic needs of the poor in 
order to uplift their human dignity, thus facilitating social change (Liebenberg, 
2002: 160). The concept ‘transformative Constitution’, as observed by Liebenberg, 
implies two things: on the one hand, it means an undoing of the injustices of 
colonial and apartheid rule in the political, social, economic and cultural realms; 
and on the other hand, it means the building of a new and better society, founded 
on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights. Liebenberg 
(2007: 3) adds that fundamental transformation ‘requires exposing all sources of 
public and private power to critical scrutiny, and developing new mechanisms of 
political and legal accountability’. 
Giving effect to the transformative goals of the Constitution is an on-going 
process and democratic participation is crucial in this process. As Justice Langa 
observes,
Transformation is not a temporary phenomenon that ends when we all have equal 
access to resources and basic services and when lawyers and judges embrace a culture 
of justification. Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that 
creates a space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways 
of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which change 
is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant. This is perhaps the ultimate vision 
of a transformative, rather than a transitional Constitution. This is the perspective that 
sees the Constitution as not transformative because of its peculiar historical position or 
its particular socio-economic goals but because it envisions a society that will always 
be defined by transformation. (Langa, 2006: 354)
Similarly, the Constitutional Court has seen participatory democracy to be of 
‘special importance to those who are relatively disempowered in a country such 
as [South Africa] where great disparity of wealth and influence exist’ (Doctors 
for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 
[12] BCLR 1399 [CC], para 108).
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Courts and Social Change
Courts are relevant to social change, as their decisions have an impact on society. 
A court’s transformative performance, as observed by Gloppen (2006: 38), is 
‘their contribution to the altering of structured inequalities and power relations’. 
Social transformation has been defined as ‘the altering of structured inequalities 
and power relations in society that reduce the weight of morally irrelevant 
circumstances such as socio-economic status/class, gender, race, religion or social 
orientation’ (Domingo, 2006: 2; Gloppen, 2006: 37–38). Put differently, do courts 
serve as an institutional voice for the poor and contribute to social inclusion of the 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups? (Gloppen, 2006: 38). Writing with 
regard to the South African context, Budlender (2007) observes that courts have 
an important role to play in achieving the transformative goals of the Constitution. 
Courts can contribute to social change directly or indirectly. Directly by 
(a) providing a space where the concerns of marginalised groups can be raised as 
legal claims and providing legal redress in ways that have implications for law, 
policy and administrative action; and (b) protecting existing pro-poor institutional 
arrangements and reinforcing pro-poor state policies. Indirectly by (a) enabling 
marginalised groups to effectively fight for social transformation in other arenas 
through securing their rights of political participation and to information; and (b) 
passively serving as a platform where claims can be articulated. For example, as 
a central point for mobilisation and publicity that may result in important political 
effects even in the absence of the judgement (Gloppen, 2006: 38).
Litigation is often pursued as an important strategy to bring about social 
change, especially regarding inequalities and access to services by the poor. 
Litigation can result in policy formulation or reformulation, lead to political 
mobilisation and achieve legal enforcement of legal standards (Mbazira, 2008: 
5–6). It may, however, fail to drive socio-economic transformation as rapidly as 
expected (Mbazira, 2008: 5). 
A number of variables in the litigation process impact on the court’s role in 
social transformation. Differences in courts’ transformation performance can be 
explained in terms of variations at the four stages of litigation, identified by 
Gloppen (2006: 36–37, 43), namely: (a) voice—the ability of marginalised groups 
to effectively articulate their demands through legal action; (b) responsiveness—
the willingness of the courts to respond to the concerns of the marginalised; 
(c) capability—the judge’s ability to give legal effect to socio-economic rights in 
ways that affect the marginalised groups; and (d) compliance—the extent to which 
judicial decisions are politically authoritative and whether political branches 
comply with them and implement and reflect them in legislation and policies. 
Hence, litigation can either lead to improvements, limited or no improvements 
in the lives of the poor. Accordingly, in relation to the South African context, 
Mbazira (2007: 5) has observed that though the realisation of socio-economic 
rights means amelioration of the conditions of the poor and the beginning of a 
generation that is free from socio-economic need, this is not always the case. Due 
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to the normative construction of socio-economic rights or the weakness of 
the remedies ordered, ‘court victories may either be followed by very minimal 
improvements or no improvements at all’. Budlender (2007: 9) also identifies (a) 
the difficulties in finding appropriate remedies for breaches of socio-economic 
rights; and (b) the tendency to view these rights as exotic and fundamentally 
different from civil and political rights, as obstacles to the courts’ ability to 
effectively achieve the transformative potential of the Constitution. 
The subsequent paragraphs consider the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence, with the aim of establishing its role as an instrument of social 
change and in furthering the interests of the poor and disadvantaged. It should be 
noted that individual judges’ orientation to social change is also a relevant factor 
in understanding the capacity of a court to contribute to progressive social change.
The Constitutional Court’s Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence
The Constitutional Court, as Dugard and Roux (2006: 108) point out, is committed 
to overseeing the transformation of the South African legal system so as to reflect 
the needs, values and aspirations of the poor. Their study is instructive on the 
extent to which the Constitutional Court has provided an institutional voice for 
the poor. Liebenberg’s studies (as seen below) are also useful in understanding the 
transformative potential of the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence.
Following the inclusions of socio-economic rights in the South African 
Constitution, the courts have sought to translate these rights into enforceable legal 
claims. They have protected socio-economic rights in different ways, including 
hearing challenges to the constitutionality of any rule of statutory, common or 
customary law on the basis of a constitutional socio-economic right, or challenges 
to state or private conduct as inconsistent with a socio-economic right. The courts 
have readily engaged with legislation in attempts to broaden the protection of 
socio-economic rights, and have demonstrated that they are willing to enforce not 
just the negative prohibitions but also the positive duties imposed by socio-
economic rights. 
The Constitutional Court has dealt with and handed down judgement in several 
socio-economic rights cases, eleven of which are considered below. The judgement 
in all the cases, but for two, has been favourable (to some extent) to the applicants.
Right to health care
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) was 
the first case on the right to health care and also the first socio-economic rights 
case that the Constitutional Court heard. It concerned a challenge to the resource 
rationing policy of a state hospital, according to which Soobramoney, who 
suffered from chronic renal failure, was excluded from a renal dialysis treatment 
programme due to his general state of health and the fact that his condition was 
irreversible. The Court found in this case that the constitutional right not to be 
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refused emergency medical treatment (section 27[3] of the Constitution) did not 
extend to renal dialysis. It was of the view that emergency treatment is the sort of 
treatment that an individual receives in trauma and emergency wards following a 
serious accident and Soobramoney’s situation did not require such level of care 
(Paras 13–22). Hence, no relief was granted to the applicant, who subsequently 
died of kidney failure shortly after the judgement. 
The second case on the right to health care was Minister of Health and Others 
v Treatment Action Campaign [TAC] 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), which concerned a 
challenge to the state’s policy on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV, which was challenged as inconsistent with the right to have access to 
health care services. As part of efforts aimed at combating HIV, the government 
devised a programme for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
at birth using the antiretroviral (ARV) drug, nevirapine. According to the 
programme, use of the drug was permissible at limited number of pilot sites, with 
the result that only about 10 per cent of all births in the public sector could benefit 
from the policy. The Court found the government’s programme to be unreasonable 
in that it was inflexible and failed to take into account the needs of a particularly 
vulnerable group (HIV-positive mothers and children who did not have access to 
the pilot sites). The programme also restricted the provision of the drug and failed 
to provide for training of counsellors in the use of the drug for the purposes of 
reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The Court granted both declaratory 
and mandatory orders. It declared the government’s policy to be unreasonable. 
The Court also directed that the restrictions on the use of the antiretroviral (ARV) 
drug outside of the selected research sites be removed and that the drug be 
administered in other public hospitals and clinics, and counselling facilities be 
extended to them as well (Para 135).
Liebenberg (2005: 5) has argued that the Court could have done more to 
address the extreme inequality in access to health care services. This is based on 
the fact that the judgement contains no analysis of the vastly unequal distribution 
of resources between the public and private health care sectors. Such an analysis 
is crucial as it could result in the unravelling of factors that give rise to deprivations 
or limit access to health care, which will in turn enable the Court to effectively 
enforce the right in a way that results in social change on the ground. 
Right to housing
Seven of the cases that the Constitutional Court has dealt with concerned housing 
rights, mainly in the context of an eviction. The first housing rights case considered 
by the Court was Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). It concerned the right to have access 
to adequate housing for those subject to evictions. The Court held that the 
obligation imposed on the government is to put in place a reasonable programme, 
subject to available resources, to realise the right of access to adequate housing. It 
found the government’s housing programme to be unreasonable because it made 
no provision for access to housing for people in desperate need, thus in violation 
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of the right to have access to adequate housing. The Court granted a declaratory 
order, requiring the state to adopt, implement and supervise a comprehensive 
and coordinated programme that addressed effectively the situation of those 
desperately in need of housing. That is, those ‘who have no access to land, no roof 
over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations’ 
(Para 99). 
Subsequently, the National Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in Emer- 
gency Circumstances (Emergency Housing Programme) was adopted in April 
2004, which would temporarily alleviate the housing problems faced by many 
poor South Africans. The programme aims to assist groups of people faced with 
urgent housing problems, such as evictions, floods and fires, by providing 
temporary assistance in the form of municipal grants. Such grants would enable 
the Municipality to respond to emergencies by providing secure access to land, 
boosting infrastructure and basic services, and improving access to shelter through 
voluntary relocation and resettlement. Municipalities are encouraged to assess in 
advance the emergency housing needs in their areas and take concrete steps to 
address them. The programme thus increases the possibility of those in desperate 
need to receive relief or assistance from the government, thus providing a safety 
net in situations where communities are faced with evictions that will leave them 
in crisis. Prior to Grootboom, the government had shown no sign of putting such 
a programme in place.
The Grootboom decision has generally had a huge impact on subsequent socio-
economic rights cases—these cases have relied on the principles laid down in 
Grootboom. For example, in the TAC case, the reasonableness review approach 
that the Court adopted in Grootboom (discussed further below) was used to 
achieve a major victory in the provision of drugs for the prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV/AIDS.
The case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 
1268 (CC) is a leading case on how housing legislation can be interpreted to 
promote the purpose and values underlying the constitutional right to have access 
to adequate housing and the protection against arbitrary eviction. The municipality 
argued in this case that giving alternative land to the occupiers concerned would 
be preferential treatment, would disrupt the existing housing programme and 
would be ‘queue-jumping’. The Constitutional Court rejected this argument, 
finding that the municipality was obliged to provide alternative accommodation 
or land prior to an eviction (Paras 29–30, 39–47 and 56–59). The municipality had 
also not engaged in any discussions with the occupiers to identify their particular 
circumstances or needs, which the Court found to be at odds with its constitutional 
obligations (Paras 45, 56 and 61). 
In addition to clarifying the state’s negative obligation, the Court also read 
positive obligations into the constitutional right to be protected from arbitrary 
evictions (section 26[3] of the Constitution). The state has to take reasonable 
steps to get an agreed mediated solution and to provide suitable alternative 
accommodation particularly for vulnerable groups such as the elderly, children, 
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disabled persons and female-headed households (paras 30 and 61). The Court’s 
judgement, as Dugard and Roux (2006: 114) rightly observe, ‘provide concrete 
benefits to poor people, in as much as municipal evictions may not proceed 
without a proper plan of relocation’. In addition, the Court’s approach helps 
unravel factors that give rise to deprivation through its careful analysis of the 
historical, socio-economic, political and legal factors that stimulate eviction of 
poor people from their homes. The Port Elizabeth Municipality case is also 
important in that it aims to strike a balance between property rights and housing 
rights (Para 23).
Another case that attempts to strike such a balance is President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others 2005 (8) 
BCLR 786 (CC), concerning a private landowner’s efforts to execute an eviction 
order granted by the High Court against a community occupying its land. The 
landowner was unsuccessful in getting various organs of the state to assist him in 
enforcing the order. The case reinforces the obligation of the state to provide 
alternative accommodation to vulnerable people. The Court held that the residents 
are entitled to occupy the land until alternative land is made available to them by 
the state, or provincial, or local authority (Para 68). The Court also held that 
progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing for the 
homeless requires ‘careful planning’, ‘fair procedures’ and ‘orderly and predictable 
processes’ (Para 49). The Court further found that, by failing to do anything to 
stop the occupation of the land and assisting in enforcing the eviction order, the 
state infringed the landowner’s right to an effective remedy. Accordingly, the 
Court required the state to compensate the landowner for the occupation of his 
land—a novel remedy. The Court’s judgement in this case prevented the eviction 
of the occupiers from the land and the landowner was compensated for bearing 
the duty of accommodating the occupiers. Froneman (2007: 23) lists the 
Modderklip case as one of the cases in which the Court has found a way of dealing 
with factual situations of basic need.
The case of Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 
2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) reinforces the constitutional protection of people against 
loss of their homes without alternatives. It was a challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 that permitted the sale in execution of 
people’s homes in order to satisfy debts. The effect of the sale in execution would 
be the eviction of people from their homes, without the provision of suitable 
alternative accommodation. The Constitutional Court found this to be an unjusti- 
fiable limitation of the constitutional right to have access to adequate housing 
(Paras 34 and 39). Considering, inter alia, the issue of security of tenure in the 
light of the historical context, the Court’s remedy was to ‘read-in’ words into the 
Magistrates’ Court Act to ensure that people’s homes can only be sold if a court 
has ordered so after considering all the relevant circumstances (Paras 34 and 39). 
In other words, judicial oversight was therefore seen as an appropriate remedy. 
Judicial oversight is, in fact, crucial in ensuring that constitutional rights are 
adequately enforced. Dugard and Roux (2006: 118) have observed that Jaftha 
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indicates the Court’s willingness ‘to listen and respond to concerns of the poor 
where doing so does not involve it in second-guessing the wisdom of post-
apartheid transformation policies’.
Another housing rights case that represents a victory for poor people facing 
eviction for health and safety reasons is that of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and 
Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) [Olivia 
Road]. The case raised the difficult issue of how to reconcile respect for the 
inadequate accommodation which people living on the margins (desperately poor 
people) have managed to secure, and the statutory powers and duties of local 
authorities to ensure that conditions of accommodation do not constitute a threat 
to the safety of these persons (Chenwi and Liebenberg, 2008). The decision 
reaffirms the Constitution’s transformative role. The judgement reinforced the 
obligation to engage with people meaningfully before evicting them and the 
provision of suitable alternative accommodation or land, as well as underscoring 
the requirement of judicial oversight over all evictions (Paras 16–19, 21 and 
43–44). The decision further develops the reasonableness standard though it was 
not based on the reasonableness test developed in Grootboom. In citing section 
26(2) as one of the bases for meaningful engagement, the Court grounds the 
engagement process in the reasonableness concept and expands the reasonableness 
criteria to include meaningful engagement in the context of an eviction. This 
interpretation is supported by subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court in 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 
Case 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) (Para 117) where reasonable engagement was 
considered in determining whether an eviction was a reasonable measure to 
facilitate the government’s housing development programme; and Mazibuko & 
Others v City of Johannesburg & Others 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) (Paras 133 and 
134) where the Court considered adequate public consultation in determining the 
reasonableness of pre-paid water meters. 
The Olivia Road judgement further defines the obligations of local authorities 
with regard to the occupiers of abandoned or dilapidated buildings. The Court 
recognises the core importance of fostering participation and gives content to the 
right of participation by those faced with eviction as well as develops the principle 
of accountability. It thus enhances the possibilities for the kind of participatory 
democracy that forms part of the constitutional vision of democracy. In Minister 
of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 
(8) BCLR 872 (CC) paras 111, 625 and 627, the Constitutional Court stated that 
the Constitution contemplates participatory democracy that is accountable, 
transparent, responsive, open and makes provision for the participation of society 
in decision-making processes. The Court in Olivia Road thus contributes to the 
promotion of participatory citizenship by the poor and recognises and enhances 
the dignity of the poor. The Court further ‘read-in’ words into the challenged 
legislation (the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 
1977), so as to provide for judicial oversight of evictions in terms of the legislation. 
This case illustrates that when laws or conduct that deprive poor people of existing 
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access to socio-economic rights are at issue, the Court is willing to apply a 
stringent standard of review (Liebenberg, 2008: 95).
The Olivia Road case has, however, been seen as one of the cases in which the 
Court failed to use the opportunity to pronounce on potentially transformative 
issues such as whether the right of access to adequate housing requires a con- 
sideration of location in the provision of alternative accommodation and whether 
the municipality’s inner city housing plans’ failure to make provision for the poor 
was unconstitutional. The Court did not develop the right to housing jurisprudence 
beyond its decision in Grootboom and therefore ‘failed to tackle the policies and 
practices at the core of the vulnerability of poor people living in locations earmarked 
for commercial developments’ and ‘to establish critical rights-based safeguards for 
extremely vulnerable groupings’ (Dugard, 2008: 237–38). 
The subsequent cases of Joe Slovo and Abahlali base Mjondolo Movement of 
South Africa and Another v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu–Natal and Others 
2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) also represent victories for the poor. The Joe Slovo case 
was about the eviction of a large and settled community from their homes in the 
Joe Slovo informal settlement in Cape Town to make way for formal housing 
under the N2 Gateway Housing Project. This project was a joint programme by 
the national Housing Department, the Western Cape Provincial Government and 
the City of Cape (Municipality), aimed at upgrading informal settlements in 
Gugulethu, Cross Roads, Khayelitsha, and Langa as a lead pilot project. Though 
the Constitutional Court ordered the eviction of the residents, it specified a number 
of pro-poor issues. The Court specified in detail the quality and nature of the 
temporary housing where the people are to be relocated to, including the provision 
of services and facilities (Para 7). It further required the respondents in the case 
(Thubelisha Homes, the national Minister of Housing and the Western Cape 
provincial Minister of Local Government and Housing) to engage meaningfully 
with the residents on the timeframe of the relocation and also to consult with 
affected residents on each individual’s relocation. The Court was more robust as 
regards the engagement process, providing a detailed engagement order including 
a range of issues on which the government is required to consult, which it pointed 
out were not exhaustive (Para 7). The Court also ordered the respondents to ensure 
that 70 per cent of the new homes to be built at Joe Slovo were allocated to current 
Joe Slovo residents, or former residents who had moved to Delft previously to 
make way for the N2 Gateway Project (Paras 5 and 7). The remaining 30 per cent 
were to be allocated to people living in backyard shacks in the neighbouring 
township of Langa (Paras 187, 248 and 307). The eviction order has been 
suspended based on the government’s concern that there is no plan to accommodate 
those who would not benefit from the new houses and that the relocation might 
end up costing more than upgrading Joe Slovo settlement (Majavu, 2009). 
The Abahlali case concerned the constitutionality of the KwaZulu–Natal 
Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 (the Slums 
Act). The Act aims to eliminate slums, prevent the re-emergence of slums, to 
upgrade and control of existing slums and improve the living conditions of 
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communities. On the contrary, the Slums Act paved the way for evictions that are 
contrary to the Constitution—it precludes meaningful engagement between 
municipalities and unlawful occupiers, violates the principle that evictions should 
be a measure of last resort, and mandates the institution of eviction proceedings. 
The Constitutional Court, while finding that the province had the competence to 
pass the Act, found the Act to be unconstitutional as it contravenes the framework 
for the eviction of unlawful occupiers contained in the Constitution and housing 
legislation, that ensure that housing rights are not violated without proper notice 
and consideration of all alternatives (Paras 110–129). The decision prevented the 
eviction of many poor people without adequate safeguards for their housing rights 
had the Slums Act been implemented in its current form. The government is 
therefore required to ensure that its approach to informal settlements or slum 
conditions is pro-poor and acknowledges peoples’ existing circumstances and that 
it directs efforts more at the improvement of the lives of those who live in slums 
and informal settlements rather than at the ‘eradication’ of slums.
Right to social security and assistance
The extension to others of a socio-economic benefit provided to one class was 
also at issue in the case of Khosa v Minister of Social Development (2004) 6 SA 
505 (CC). This case concerned a challenge to the provisions of the Social 
Assistance Act 59 of 1992 for excluding people with permanent residence status 
from accessing social assistance. The Constitutional Court upheld this challenge 
on the grounds that the exclusion violated the right to have access to social 
assistance and unfairly discriminated against permanent residents in violation of 
the right to equality, in particular, the right not to be unfairly discriminated against. 
The Court rejected the government’s contention that it does not have the required 
resources. It was in fact of the view that the importance of realising the rights of 
permanent residents outweighed the financial considerations that the state relied 
on; this is because a denial impacts on their life and dignity (Para 82). The Court’s 
remedy, a relatively intrusive one, was to ‘read-in’ the excluded group (Paras 
86–96). The Court’s remedy in the Khosa case, therefore, allowed permanent 
residents to have the same social assistance benefits as South African citizens. 
Right to water
The Mazibuko case was not a victory for the poor residents of Phiri, a township in 
Soweto. The case concerned the lawfulness of prepayment water meters (PPMs) 
and the sufficiency of the City of Johannesburg’s free basic water (FBW) policy 
and. The High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in the case had both found in 
favour of the applicants, finding PPMs to be unlawful and also that the 25 litres per 
person per day water allocation. The High Court found 50 litres of water per person 
per day to constitute sufficient water in terms of Section 27(1) of the Constitution 
guaranteeing the right of access to sufficient water, while the Supreme Court of 
Appeal found 42 litres of water per person per day to be sufficient. Conversely, the 
Constitutional Court adopted a restrictive approach to its role in determining the 
content of socio-economic rights. The Court did not find it appropriate to give a 
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quantified content to what constitutes ‘sufficient water’ because it is a matter for 
the government to decide. The Court held:
[O]rdinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what 
the achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps 
government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right. This is a 
matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of government 
best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to 
determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, 
it is desirable as a matter of democratic accountability that they should do so for 
it is their programmes and promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice. 
(Para 61) 
The Constitutional Court was again, as in Grootboom and TAC, unwilling to 
recognise a minimum core approach, which would have entitled the residents of 
Phiri to the provision of sufficient water from the state.
The Constitutional Court’s Approach: Reasonableness vs Minimum Core
The government’s socio-economic rights obligation, as set out in the South 
African Constitution (for example, Sections 24(5), 26(2) and 27(2)), requires it to 
adopt reasonable legislative and other measures that make it possible for those in 
need to access socio-economic goods and services and to provide material goods 
and services when the need arises. This has resulted in the Constitutional Court 
adopting a reasonableness approach in reviewing compliance with this obligation.
The ‘reasonableness review’ approach was first adopted by the Court in the 
Grootboom case. In order for measures to be reasonable, they must aim at the 
effective and expeditious progressive realisation of the right in question, within 
the states’ available resources for implementation. The measures must be com- 
prehensive, coherent, inclusive, balanced, flexible, transparent, be properly 
conceived and properly implemented, and make short-, medium- and long-term 
provision for those in desperate need or in crisis situations. The measures must 
further clearly set out the responsibilities of the different spheres of government 
and ensure that financial and human resources are available for their imple- 
mentation. This approach has been criticised on the basis that it creates a number 
of difficulties for the enforcement of socio-economic rights by individuals and 
groups living in poverty. This difficulty, as pointed out by Liebenberg (2005: 6), 
arises from the fact that the applicants would have to marshal a considerable array 
of economic and expert evidence to convince a court that the government’s social 
policy is unreasonable, which poor applicants might not be able to do (see also 
Liebenberg, 2008). Similarly, Dugard and Roux (2006: 113, 116) observe that the 
approach ‘requires litigants to have a sophisticated understanding of often 
complex policy and budgetary issues’, which ‘has the potential to diminish the 
capacity of the Court to function as an institutional voice for the poor’ and 
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discourages the poor to bring cases unless they are able to secure ‘substantial legal 
and other expert support’. Placing the burden of proving reasonableness of its lack 
of provisioning on the state, as has been suggested by Liebenberg (2008: 91), 
would address the above concern. The state would therefore have to show that it 
had exhausted all reasonable alternatives to ensure that disadvantaged groups do 
not experience a total denial of access to basic needs.
However, the advantage of the reasonableness approach is that it gives wide 
latitude to the political branches of government to make the appropriate policy 
choices to meet their socio-economic rights obligations, with the court’s role 
being to determine whether they fall within the bounds of ‘reasonableness’; thus 
addressing separation of power concerns. In addition, the fact that the reason- 
ableness approach is determined on a case-by-case basis and is context sensitive 
creates the on-going possibility of challenging socio-economic deprivations in the 
light of changing historical, social and economic contexts (Grootboom, Paras 
43–44 and 82–83). Liebenberg (2005: 5) has also stated that the reasonableness 
review approach ‘can facilitate the creation of a participatory, dialogical space for 
considering social rights claims’.
The reasonableness approach is applied in relation to the positive obligations 
of the government. When it comes to violations of negative obligations, a more 
stringent standard is applied because such violations can only be justified in terms 
of the general limitation clause of the Constitution (Section 36).
In adopting the reasonableness approach, the Constitutional Court turned a 
deaf ear to the minimum core approach, which would entitle individuals to 
the provision of basic levels of socio-economic goods and services from the 
government. The minimum core approach is aimed at protecting the most 
vulnerable groups of society. It involves identifying such subsistence levels in 
respect of each socio-economic right and insisting that the provision of ‘core’ 
goods and services enjoys immediate priority. It thus represents a ‘floor’ of 
immediately enforceable entitlements from which progressive realisation should 
proceed (Pieterse, 2006: 481). In Grootboom, the Court stated that it is not possible 
to determine a minimum threshold for the right to adequate housing without first 
identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of the right (Para 32). In 
the TAC case, the Court stated that the socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core 
be provided to them, without considerations of progressive realisation and 
resource availability (Paras 34 and 39). The Court’s reluctance to endorse the 
minimum core approach in a subsequent case has been based on institutional and 
democratic concerns. It is important to note that some have argued that the 
minimum core approach is not appropriate for judicial review of positive socio-
economic rights claims (Sachs, 2003; Wesson, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance, the reasonableness approach thus has 
some elements of minimum core obligations. While emphasising the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights, the Constitutional Court also holds that 
people in desperate need should not be left without any form of assistance, 
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intrinsically implying recognition of minimum core. Bilchitz has thus stated that 
in attempting to avoid recognising a minimum core obligation, the Court has in 
fact incorporated an obligation to meet, at the very minimum, the short-term 
needs into the notion of reasonableness (Bilchitz, 2007: 149). 
Compliance with Judicial Decisions
In order for litigation to improve the rights situation on the ground, the relevant 
authorities must comply with judicial decisions and political action must be taken 
to implement court orders (Gloppen, 2006: 53). Put differently, ‘the ability of 
litigation to effect real social change depends in large part on the government’s 
willingness to respect and implement the court’s judgments’ (Marcus and 
Budlender, 2008). Though the Constitutional Court has laid down a number of pro- 
poor principles and rules, compliance with these have been an issue of concern, 
with the consequence being that successful litigants are unable to benefit fully 
from the orders arising from their victories. Consequently, they continue to live in 
poverty and socio-economic deprivation.
Gloppen (2006: 54–55) has identified a number of factors that influence 
compliance with judicial decisions. These include: first, factors within the judicial 
system such as the professionalism and capacity of the judges to devise acceptable 
legal remedies, and whether the decisions include enforcement mechanisms such 
as mandatory or supervisory orders or contempt of court orders in cases of non-
compliance; second, factors outside the legal system such as the political and 
economic context, the legitimacy of the court in various sectors of the society; and 
the capacity of the government to implement the decisions. In addition, Muralidhar 
(2002) has observed that states are more sluggish to enforce declaratory orders 
than mandatory orders. 
Some of the above factors have accounted for the slow implementation of 
court orders in South Africa. For instance, the nature of the order in the Grootboom 
case—a weak, declaratory order—has been identified as a contributing factor to 
its relatively tardy implementation (Liebenberg, 2008; Pillay 2002a; 2002b). It 
should be noted that even the interlocutory order, which was initiated by the 
government and should have been relatively simple to implement, took months to 
be put in place as reported by Marcus and Budlender (2008: 61). They further 
reported that ‘the majority of the Grootboom community continues to live in 
appalling conditions to this day and many are deeply disillusioned with the legal 
processes involved in the case’. They, however, add that whatever the limits of 
Grootboom for social change in the Grootboom community, it continues to play a 
key role in achieving tangible social change for others in a variety of areas (Marcus 
and Budlender, 2008: 62, 66). Also, as noted above, the implementation of the 
Emergency Housing Programme arising from this judgement has been rather 
slow. Furthermore, the communities involved in the Modderklip case are still 
faced with illegal evictions.
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The TAC case was also followed by a lack of urgency in implementing the 
Court’s orders at both national and provincial levels. This prompted the applicants 
to undertake a range of actions to ensure proper implementation. They held 
meetings with various government officials and threatened instituting contempt of 
court proceedings (Marcus and Budlender, 2008: 89). The Olivia Road case, on the 
other hand, has been seen as one of the cases that show that the state can be 
compliant after all due to the, comparatively, short time-frame within which the 
judgement was enforced (Mbazira, 2008: 20). The eviction order in Joe Slovo has 
been suspended, while the government ascertains the possibility of in-situ upgrade. 
The slow implementation of court orders has resulted in calls for a structural 
interdict as a means of ensuring compliance (Budlender, 2007: 11; Mbazira, 2007: 
310–92; 2008: 17). In the TAC case (Paras 106–114), the Constitutional Court did 
not find the granting of a structural interdict to be appropriate in this case. In 
addition, Thipanyane (2004) has suggested that parliament and respective 
provincial legislatures have to be more active in holding the executive branch of 
government to account for delays in implementing decisions of the judiciary.
Conclusion
The Constitutional Court, in its socio-economic rights jurisprudence, has laid 
down a number of pro-poor principles and rules. It has acknowledged the poor as 
a vulnerable group whose needs require special attention, by subjecting the state’s 
justifications to more stringent scrutiny when disadvantaged groups are deprived 
of access to essential services and resources. The Court has promoted a culture of 
justification by requiring the state to justify its socio-economic priority-setting, 
which as Liebenberg (2008: 90) observed, is ‘an important element in South 
Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism’. 
In addition, the Constitutional Court’s decisions have impacted significantly 
on the government’s attitude towards socio-economic rights, making it more 
responsive to socio-economic concerns and though not clearly at the pace and to 
the extent people expect. The decisions on housing rights have changed the law 
on housing and eviction; affording protection to the poor and vulnerable. It has 
offered them, at the very least, some degree of security of tenure that they would 
not otherwise have had. The following words by Budlender (Langford 2003: 98) 
sum up the strength of the TAC case in achieving social change: ‘The TAC case 
has literally saved the lives of very many thousands of kids’. The Khosa 
case resulted in permanent residents having access to a social benefit that they 
initially could not have access to. The Olivia Road case, through the meaningful 
engagement ordered, created a voice for the poor and marginalised and contributed 
to social inclusion of the poor, disadvantaged and marginalised people in remedial 
decision-making. Meaningful engagement with communities on socio-economic 
rights was further emphasised in Joe Slovo, Abahlali and Mazibuko, thus 
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accentuating and enhancing participatory democracy in the realisation of socio-
economic rights.
Notwithstanding, while acknowledging the Constitutional Court’s role in 
facilitating social change, Dugard and Roux (2006: 113, 114, 118) found the 
Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence to be ‘a little disappointing from a 
pro-poor perspective’. Their conclusion is based on the fact that none of the 
judgements they considered (between the period 1994 and 2004) provided any 
‘direct, substantive relief to the applicants’ (they mandated that the applicable 
government policy be change), and the standard of review adopted by the Court 
makes it difficult for the poor to litigate cases. Hence, much still needs to be done 
to promote socio-economic transformation in the interests of the poor and 
disadvantaged, including improving access to the courts by the poor in order to 
bring cases that could result in social change.
On the question of access to legal representation by the poor, a factor that 
impacts on the ability of the poor to bring cases, Dugard (2008: 217–26, 232) has 
observed that the judiciary, as an institution, has done little to address this issue. 
Though acknowledging that it is unfair to place such a burden on the judiciary, she 
argues that the judiciary could have meaningfully advanced access to justice for 
the poor through (a) prioritising the delineation of a comprehensive right to legal 
representation at state expense for both civil and criminal matters; and (b) being 
actively involved in strengthening and promoting the courts’ internal system for 
securing legal representation to the poor. She also suggested that by utilising the 
direct access mechanism—allowing constitutional matters to be brought directly 
to it by poor people who have been unable to secure legal representation—the 
Constitutional Court could live up to its transformative promises of being an 
institutional voice for the poor. The question of finding an appropriate remedy is 
still a challenge. There is also the need to strengthen the participation of the poor 
in decision-making processes and service delivery projects.
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